Facebook & VISA phishing campaign proposed by ZeuS

Updated 21.02.2010
More active domains belonging to the same phishing campaign against users of VISA. The domains are:

reports.cforms.visa.com.desz.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
reports.cforms.visa.com.desz.ne.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
reports.cforms.visa.com.desz.or.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
reports.cforms.visa.com.ersm.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
reports.cforms.visa.com.edase.or.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
reports.cforms.visa.com.ersm.ne.kr/secureapps/

Original 20.02.2010
ZeuS has a fairly large repertoire with proposed strategies to Scam to spread their trojan and phishing attacks against banks, many companies and well known.

We have recently warned of a campaign Scam using as cover to the IRS, which has been generating a long time but every so often is reactivated, forming a cycle that seeks to disseminate criminal ZeuS and that holds for all strategies.

Now, once again active phishing campaign that involves Facebook.

The domains involved are:

http://www.facebook.com.edase.or.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.ersm.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.edasn.ne.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.desz.or.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.desz.ne.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.ersq.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.edase.co.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.edasq.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.ersw.co.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.ersa.or.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.edasn.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.edasa.ne.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.ersm.or.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.edasq.ne.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.edasn.or.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php
http://www.facebook.com.ersa.or.kr/usersdirectory/LoginFacebook.php

Like other campaigns, the page's source code has injected a tag iframe, which in this case redirects to hxxp://109.95.114.251/us01d/in.php.

This page (in.php) redirection to:

http://109.95.114.251/us01d/load.php
http://109.95.114.251/us01d/file.exe
http://109.95.114.251/us01d/xd/pdf.pdf
http://109.95.114.251/us01d/xd/sNode.php

From whom are trying to exploit some exploits: CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992, CVE-2008-0015 and CVE-2009-0927.

This server is also currently serving another massive campaign, but spreading the trojan ZeuS through a Scam IRS. In this case, just change the folder where the package is housed, namely: hxxp://109.95.114.251/usa50/in.php

As we see, Zeus does not stop at his criminal career. In fact, there are also other campaigns more active, such as those involving a phishing attack by hiding under the VISA logo.

In this case, other domains used are:

http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasa.or.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.ersq.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edase.co.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.ersq.co.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasq.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.ersm.co.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.ersw.co.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.ersa.or.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasn.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasa.ne.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.ersm.or.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasq.ne.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edase.ne.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasq.co.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasa.co.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasa.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edase.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php
http://reports.cforms.visa.com.edasn.or.kr/secureapps/vdir/cholderform.php

Related information
ZeuS on IRS Scam remains actively exploited
Zeus and the theft of sensitive information
Leveraging ZeuS to send spam through social networks
ZeuS Botnet y su poder de reclutamiento zombi
ZeuS, spam y certificados SSL
Eficacia de los antivirus frente a ZeuS
Special!!! ZeuS Botnet for Dummies
Botnet. Securización en la nueva versión de ZeuS
Fusión. Un concepto adoptado por el crimeware actual
ZeuS Carding World Template. (...) la cara de la botnet
Financial institutions targeted by the botnet Zeus. Part two
Financial institutions targeted by the botnet Zeus. Part one
LuckySploit, the right hand of ZeuS
Botnet Zeus. Mass propagation of his Trojan. Part two
Botnet Zeus. Mass propagation of his Trojan. Part one

Jorge Mieres